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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
More than ten years after it was launched, the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has achieved some impressive 
results. It has restored law and order in Solomon Islands; it has 
reconstituted a shattered economy; and it has helped rebuild the broken 
machinery of government. But it has also cost Australia some $2.6 
billion, a massive and disproportionate investment given Australia’s 
interests in Solomon Islands. And RAMSI transformed Solomon Islands 
into one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world. 
This assessment of the achievements of RAMSI reveals important 
lessons for responses to crises in Australia’s region. These include the 
value of working with regional partners, the need to avoid building 
parallel bureaucracies, and the importance of promoting real political 
change. But the most important lesson of RAMSI for any future 
intervention is the importance of knowing how much to spend and when 
to leave. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Launched in 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) has been one of the most significant – and most expensive – 
operations spearheaded by Australia in the Pacific Islands region. It 
brought together multiple government agencies and departments in a 
massive effort to bring stability and development to one of the smallest 
and most impoverished nations in the world. Australia spent $2.6 billion 
in real terms on the Mission, representing some 95 per cent of the total 
cost of the Mission.1   
As of 1 July 2013, RAMSI has transitioned to a police-only mission, with 
the development-focused elements of the mission folded back into the 
bilateral aid programs of Australia and New Zealand. At a time when the 
Australian Government is promoting the alignment of its development 
spending with its foreign policy priorities, it is important to review the 
RAMSI exercise to understand what was, and what was not, achieved. 
In many respects RAMSI was exactly the kind of integrated pursuit of 
Australia’s aid, economic and foreign policy goals that the government is 
trying to realise through the merger of AusAID and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Indeed, RAMSI holds many lessons 
for the way that Australia will conduct its policy in the Pacific Islands in 
coming years.    
In the words of RAMSI’s first Special Coordinator Nick Warner, the 
mission was “unique and complex”. It was unique because it was a 
regional mission, with participation from all of the members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum, and unlike many other international interventions, came 
at the express request of the Solomon Islands Government. It was 
complex because it focused on three challenging tasks, which became 
the pillars of the mission: ‘Law and Justice’, ‘Economic Governance’ and 
‘Machinery of Government’. 
This Analysis will examine the successes and failures of RAMSI. It will 
consider whether the significant financial investment that was made has 
been justified. It will also identify key lessons that have been learned that 
would be applicable to Australian policy in the Pacific Islands region. 
RAMSI was “unique and complex”, but many of the economic and 
governance challenges RAMSI tackled in Solomon Islands are far from 
unique in the broader region, and in many respects, are less complex. 
THE PRICE OF SUCCESS 
RAMSI was by many measures a successful mission and many of these 
specific successes will be detailed below. But RAMSI was also a hugely 
expensive mission. In real terms, Australia spent $2.6 billion on RAMSI 
between 2003 and 2013 – although the real cost of the mission was 
probably higher.2   
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Australian government data on its own expenditure on RAMSI had not 
been collected in a consolidated, consistent and accessible format until 
the Lowy Institute requested it. This matters because it is difficult for 
government to make a proper assessment of the achievements and 
failings of the mission without a comprehensive understanding of the 
costs. The difficulty of collating expenditure data from a range of 
government departments and agencies during the mission also raises 
questions about the government’s ability to accurately forecast the cost 
of future initiatives of this type.   
Of RAMSI’s three pillars – Law and Justice, Economic Governance and 
Machinery of Government – it was Law and Justice that absorbed the 
greatest share, accounting for some 83 per cent ($2.2 billion) of the total 
expenditure. Approximately $223 million was spent on economic 
governance, $103 million on improving the machinery of government 
and $133 million on cross-mission activities.3 New Zealand spent 
approximately $173 million.4 The personnel contributions of other Pacific 
Island nations were paid for by Australia.   
To put this in perspective, before RAMSI Australian spending in 
Solomon Islands consumed just over 3 per cent of Australia’s aid to 
Oceania. During the RAMSI mission this increased to over 24 per cent.5 
Despite this massive expenditure, however, Solomon Islands still 
struggles to stand on its own feet. The April 2014 flash floods in 
Guadalcanal were a notable reminder of this. After ten years of very 
significant aid expenditure, the country faces another disaster which has 
again demonstrated its reliance on foreign aid.  
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Figure 1: Australian Expenditure on RAMSI, 2003-2013 (AUD million, constant prices 2013) 
 
 
 
Source: Expenditure data provided to the author by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Canberra, January 2014. The expenditure was released 
publicly at the Australian Senate 2013-2014 Supplementary Budget Estimates, 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 17 February 2014. 
The Lowy Institute has converted the figures from current prices to 2013 constant 
prices, using a formula consistent with that used by the Australian Government in 
reporting aid expenditure. 
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Table 1: Breakdown of Australian expenditure on RAMSI, 2003-2013 
(AUD million, constant prices 2013) 
Pillar Mission totals 
2003-2013 (A$m) 
% of Total
Law and Justice   
AFP 1,475 
 
 
AusAID 303  
Defence 406  
Pillar Total  2184 83% 
Economic Governance   
AusAID 211  
Customs 12  
Pillar Total  223 8% 
Machinery of Government   
AusAID 103  
Pillar Total  103 4% 
Cross-Mission Activities    
AusAID (Corporate Enabling) 72 
 
 
DFAT 61 
 
 
Pillar Total  133 
 
5% 
TOTAL 2,643 
 
100% 
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By many measures, Australia should be pleased that its efforts 
contributed to positive change in Solomon Islands. The relatively rapid 
restoration of law and order in 2003 was a considerable achievement. 
RAMSI’s assistance in the recovery of the shattered Solomon Islands 
economy was a massive feat, given the very deep problems in the 
economy prior to the intervention.6 The question is, however, were these 
achievements worth the price? 
Australia, through RAMSI, elevated Solomon Islands to the third largest 
recipient of Australian aid in 2003 and it remains in that position today.7 
Net Australian Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Solomon 
Islands represented 24 per cent of the total net Australian ODA to 
Oceania between 2003 and 2012. By comparison, net Australian ODA to 
Solomon Islands comprised only 3 per cent of total net Australian ODA 
to Oceania in the decade before RAMSI.8 RAMSI expenditure averaged 
$260 million a year, just short of what Australia spent in the entire 
previous decade in Solomon Islands.9   
In 2001, according to the United Nations Human Development Report 
2003, official development assistance received by Solomon Islands was 
22.2 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), almost exactly the same 
as it was in 1990 (when ODA comprised 22.1 per cent of GNI).10 By 
2010 (the year for which data was available for the United Nations 
Human Development Report 2013), ODA comprised 61.4 per cent of 
GNI. Research by the ANU’s Development Policy Centre shows that 
Solomon Islands went from being the 35th most aid dependent country in 
the world in 2000-2002 to being the second most aid dependent country 
in the world between 2009 and 2011.11   
…Solomon Islands went 
from being the 35th most 
aid dependent country in 
the world in 2000-2002 to 
being the second most 
aid dependent country in 
the world between 2009 
and 2011. 
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Figure 2: Net Australian ODA received by Solomon Islands, 1993-2012 
 
Were RAMSI’s achievements worth the $2.6 billion price tag and did 
they require a decade-long stay?12 Solomon Islands will always be 
important to Australia because of its location in Australia’s principal 
sphere of influence, the Southwest Pacific, but geography alone does 
not justify the size of Australia’s contribution over ten years. Compared 
to Papua New Guinea, which has a population of some seven million 
people and where Australian interests are deep courtesy of proximity, 
shared wartime experience, colonial history, strong investment and trade 
links, and a large aid program, Australia’s trade, investment, aid and 
even people-to-people relationships with Solomon Islands prior to 2003 
were relatively small. Between 2002 and 2012, Australian aid 
expenditure per capita in Papua New Guinea increased by 71 per cent 
(from US$40.67 to US$69.55).13 Over the same period, Australian aid 
expenditure per capita in Solomon Islands increased by 604 per cent 
(from US$58.27 to US$410.31).14 
When he launched the mission in a post 9/11 environment, the then 
Australian prime minister John Howard argued that a failed Solomon 
Islands would pose a significant security risk for the whole region and be 
vulnerable as a safe haven for transnational criminals and terrorists. 
Governance and the rule of law were failing in Solomon Islands but 
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governance challenges were common to many Pacific Island countries. 
The spectre of terrorism and dangerous transnational crime was very 
unlikely. Indeed, Howard’s overwrought justification for the mission may 
well have contributed to what in many respects has been Australia’s 
greatest failure when it comes to RAMSI: the inability to conceive and 
execute an exit. 
Before RAMSI was even established, AusAID and the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) were vocal about the need for firm criteria to judge 
when the mission had achieved its task and should be wound down. 
After RAMSI’s highly successful first year, however, the mission’s tasks 
became more difficult. A number of Solomon Islands politicians became 
less supportive of and sometimes hostile to the mission. Australian 
officials began to disagree about whether RAMSI had done enough to 
prevent Solomon Islands regressing, either through another breakdown 
in law and order, a resumption of ethnic conflict, bureaucratic failings or 
economic shocks. Events like the 2006 riots in Honiara gave risk-averse 
officials good reasons to argue that RAMSI should stay and allowed 
Australian parliamentarians to avoid difficult decisions about the future of 
Australia’s contribution to RAMSI. The shock to the economy caused by 
the global financial crisis in 2008 helped justify the continuing 
contribution to economic governance. In the case of RAMSI it was less a 
case of mission creep than mission drift. 
Solomon Islands faced very serious security and governance pressures 
from 1999 to 2003 that successive governments in Honiara were unable 
to control. After RAMSI’s successes in restoring law and order and 
helping to improve macro-economic stability in its first few years, these 
pressures had lessened considerably. Many of the remaining challenges 
faced by Solomon Islands were similar to those faced by other Pacific 
Island countries. The Australian Government was happy to accept risks 
in Papua New Guinea and other Pacific Island countries that it was not 
prepared to accept in Solomon Islands. It is not obvious why RAMSI and 
the vast Australian expenditure that was channelled through RAMSI 
were essential for a decade in Solomon Islands and why development 
challenges in Solomon Islands were more deserving of Australian 
attention and resourcing than similar challenges in other neighbouring 
countries.   
Concerns about a resurgence of violence may have been justified, but 
that does not mean that a sizeable external police and military 
contingent had to remain in the country to deal with that possibility. Gun 
crime in Solomon Islands after 2003 was very low, much lower than in 
Papua New Guinea. The effects of the global financial crisis, budgeting 
and revenue collection problems were a problem for a number of other 
Pacific Island countries, which were not attracting the same kind of 
support RAMSI offered Solomon Islands. Challenges around the 
machinery of government and rural development were also similar to 
those in other parts of the Pacific.   
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Australia’s initial decision to work with the region to establish RAMSI was 
predicated on a request from the Solomon Islands Government. While 
RAMSI only remained in Solomon Islands at the pleasure of the 
Solomon Islands Government, the commitment of the government in 
Honiara to engaging with RAMSI to implement the reforms that were 
part of RAMSI’s mandate was inconsistent over ten years. This made it 
difficult for RAMSI to achieve its own objectives. But neither this nor 
open hostility from the government of Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare from 2006-07 caused Australia to question its continued 
commitment to RAMSI. 
In addition to sensitivities at the political level, popular recognition of 
Australia’s efforts in RAMSI waned after the first year. The results of the 
2013 edition of the Solomon Islands Government RAMSI People’s 
Survey showed that only 35 per cent of those surveyed recognised 
Australia as the main provider of funding for RAMSI; 16 per cent said 
New Zealand paid, 13 per cent said the Solomon Islands Government 
paid and 66 per cent did not know.15 Australia, in fact, contributed 
approximately 95 per cent of overall RAMSI funding. 
These survey results and Australia’s often fraught relationship with 
Solomon Islands politicians serve to demonstrate Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop’s concerns that Australia has difficulties translating its massive 
aid investments in the region into either popular or political support in the 
region.16 In 2003, the Australian Government assessed the mission 
would be more likely to be successful if responsibility for it was shared 
with other Pacific Island nations. It was right. But the regional nature of 
the mission also meant Australia had to sacrifice some of the kudos for 
its contribution. Ms Bishop has been encouraging better branding of 
Australia’s aid contributions but it is unlikely that branding will address 
her concerns about recognition. In the end, Australia is probably always 
going to be forced to make a choice between effectiveness and 
recognition.   
ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Despite the significant costs of RAMSI, the mission had some significant 
achievements. It is worth looking at these in more detail. Australia’s 
experience in RAMSI also holds valuable lessons that the new 
Australian Government can apply in pursuing Australia’s interests in the 
Pacific Islands region in the future.  
LAW AND JUSTICE 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
RAMSI’s overwhelming early priority was to restore law and order in 
Solomon Islands. The breakdown of that order had largely, although not 
solely, been a result of conflict between Solomon Islands’ two main 
In 2003, the Australian 
Government assessed 
the mission would be 
more likely to be 
successful if 
responsibility for it was 
shared with other Pacific 
Island nations. It was 
right. But the regional 
nature of the mission 
also meant Australia had 
to sacrifice some of the 
kudos for its contribution. 
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ethnic groups based in the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal. The 
Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), in 
cooperation with the defence forces of New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji and Tonga and the police forces of Pacific Islands Forum 
member states assumed responsibility for this task, working alongside 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF). The three overarching 
goals of the Law and Justice pillar were to create “a RSIPF that operates 
effectively and independently of RAMSI, a correctional service of 
Solomon Islands that operates effectively and independently of RAMSI 
and a capable and independent justice system.”17   
RAMSI was first and foremost a policing mission. Approximately 300 
police officers from Australia, New Zealand and many Pacific Island 
countries formed the Participating Police Force (PPF) in July 2003. The 
PPF immediately mounted a massive policing exercise in the capital 
Honiara to build the local population’s confidence in the mission. It 
pursued and quickly arrested the most wanted criminals, Guadalcanal’s 
Harold Keke and his associates and Malaitan militants, including Jimmy 
‘Rasta’ Lusibea. Within the first three months of operation, some 3700 
firearms were surrendered or confiscated throughout Solomon Islands.18 
More than 3000 people were arrested.19  
The military contribution to the mission was to provide protection and 
support to the police rather than to perform a traditional peacekeeping 
role. Solomon Islands had suffered a breakdown in law and order, not a 
civil war. The initial intervention force consisted of approximately 1800 
military personnel. It comprised a multinational infantry battalion (with 
units from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji) 
supported by engineers, transport, helicopters and a number of naval 
vessels, including HMAS Manoora.20 The early show of military force 
was a critical factor in convincing militants and thugs to give up their 
weapons and surrender. But almost as important was the logistical 
support that the military was able to provide for the mission, which 
enabled early successes in restoring law and order.   
Although the main military contribution came from Australia, the Pacific 
Island military contingents were important to the mission. The multi-
national nature of the military forces increased its legitimacy in Solomon 
Islands and internationally. Soldiers from Fiji, Papua New Guinea and 
Tonga were able to engage more readily with Solomon Islanders than 
their Australian and New Zealand counterparts. The military contingent’s 
size and activity were reduced significantly in late 2003. The last time the 
military contingent assisted the police in a public-order response was in 
2006. The last significant security operation involving the military was 
during the 2010 elections.21 
Early high-profile successes made RAMSI popular with the people of 
Solomon Islands. When Prime Minister John Howard visited Honiara on 
25 August 2003, he was feted by hundreds of Solomon Islands children 
The early show of 
military force was a 
critical factor in 
convincing militants  
and thugs to give up  
their weapons and 
surrender. 
 AUSTRALIA’S COSTLY INVESTMENT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS: THE LESSONS OF RAMSI 
 
11
 
waving Australian flags and holding up pro-RAMSI signage along the 
road from the airport to Honiara’s town centre. But the longer-term task 
of rebuilding the RSIPF proved to be much more difficult. The 
inadequate police response to the April 2006 riots in Honiara, which 
destroyed much of the capital’s Chinatown, highlighted weaknesses in 
the PPF’s capacity-building efforts. A Commission of Inquiry into the riots 
criticised the RSIPF’s actions and highlighted the RSIPF’s lack of public-
order capability.22 The RSIPF subsequently received better training and 
oversaw security for the 2010 general election and 2012 Oceania 
Football Confederation Nations Cup without incident. 
Successive results from the annual RAMSI People’s Survey conducted 
by the ANU have indicated a continuing and worrying lack of confidence 
in the RSIPF. Even in the most recent survey, 60 per cent of Solomon 
Islanders said they were not satisfied with the help received from the 
RSIPF. More encouragingly, 30 per cent said the police had improved in 
the last five years and 34 per cent said the police had improved in some 
ways.23 As is the case in many Pacific Island countries, most police 
resources are “overwhelmingly concentrated in Honiara and other urban 
areas, leaving rural areas with little or no ready access to the RSIPF.”24 
In 2011 the PPF withdrew from all but three provincial posts, and the 
RSIPF is now responsible for operations in all but two provinces. 
Nevertheless, the RSIPF is still overwhelmingly dependent on RAMSI 
logistical and financial resources.25  
LESSONS LEARNED 
Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper identified contributing to stability 
and security in the South Pacific and Timor Leste as the second-highest-
priority task of the Australian Defence Force.26 RAMSI holds three main 
lessons for Australian military and police operations in the Pacific in the 
future.  
First, cooperation with the regional armed forces and police forces is a 
key to success. The experience of RAMSI showed that the involvement 
of regional forces helped the military communicate with and gain the 
trust of the local community, and mitigated some of the negative 
perceptions that can be associated with military deployments. The 
Australian Government should seek to involve regional defence forces in 
operations as well as training exercises involving the ADF, such as 
responses to natural disasters. The lesson is also valid for the police. 
The presence of police from other Melanesian countries helped 
Australian and New Zealand police communicate better with local 
communities in Solomon Islands and to build trust with the RSIPF itself.  
Second, more work needs to be done to promote inter-agency and inter-
departmental cooperation in these missions. DFAT and AusAID have a 
long history of close cooperation and liaison and so adapted relatively 
easily to the whole-of-government nature of RAMSI. Although the ADF 
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and AFP had worked alongside each other in Bougainville and Timor 
Leste, the structure of RAMSI was different. The ADF and AFP were 
more closely integrated in RAMSI, with the ADF playing a supporting 
role which was new to the military.27 The differences in training and 
operational methods created a number of obstacles to smooth 
integration, particularly in the early stages of the mission.  
Lieutenant-Colonel John Hutcheson, RAMSI’s second military 
commander, wrote “while the Australian Defence Force possesses a 
proactive planning culture, the PPF were largely reactive in character 
and had little appreciation of the response timings that might be required 
to conduct actions on foreign soil… the PPF’s lack of an overall 
campaign plan made it difficult to ensure that military activities supported 
the civil authority in an efficient manner.”28 Police and military 
commanders tried to address these deficiencies by collocating the PPF 
and military headquarters, expanding the use of liaison officers, running 
in-theatre training sessions and establishing combined working groups to 
coordinate inter-agency planning and resources.29   
Third, more attention needs to be paid to monitoring and assessment. 
When the AFP first engaged in RAMSI, there was no performance 
measurement framework that the AFP could adopt to assess the 
performance of its activities overseas. This made it difficult to judge the 
effectiveness of the AFP’s contributions to capacity building in the RSPIF 
and to plan a timeline for this activity. The AFP recognised this and in 
2007 began to develop appropriate performance assessment 
methodologies for the International Deployment Group (IDG), which 
were later applied to RAMSI. The PPF implemented its “first robust 
monitoring and evaluation system in March 2012.”30 This experience 
should inform the planning for future missions. Setting objectives for a 
drawdown strategy at an early stage is important. Establishing rigorous 
performance measurement and impact evaluation processes at the 
outset of an operation will help determine whether such objectives have 
been met.   
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE  
ACHIEVEMENTS 
RAMSI’s Economic Governance pillar recorded some impressive 
achievements. From a state of near collapse in 2003, the economy has 
recovered and grown steadily – by over 80 per cent in real terms.31 
Australia spent $223 million on Economic Governance over ten years.32 
Treasury, finance and customs officials from Australia and New Zealand 
were placed in key economic ministries in Solomon Islands to assist 
Solomon Islands officials.    
RAMSI assistance helped the Solomon Islands Government to stabilise 
public finances. Revenue collection had collapsed prior to the 
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intervention. A key focus of RAMSI was to improve taxation 
administration and compliance. A taxation amnesty was implemented. 
The private sector was encouraged to meet tax obligations, which was 
supported by the reform of taxation policy. All of these steps led to the 
recovery of revenue collection.33 Controls and discipline were imposed 
on the budget and better budgeting processes were restored over time.  
Foreign investment has returned to Solomon Islands, facilitated by a 
reduction in sovereign risk and reductions in the cost of doing business. 
In 1996, total investment comprised approximately 4.5 per cent of GDP. 
Since 2005 investment from donors, government and private sector 
sources has averaged around 20 per cent of GDP per annum.34 This 
has been reflected in new projects such as the Gold Ridge mine and 
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Plantations.35 There have been new 
investments in the telecommunications sector, as well as donor-funded 
investments in infrastructure. Export and imports have grown 
substantially – although this has been led by growth in timber exports 
that is widely believed to be unsustainable.36  
A series of economic reforms that focused on improving the regulatory 
environment for business and improving the standards of government 
have helped strengthen the national economy and have gradually 
improved living standards. The Foreign Investment Act was amended to 
reduce processing times for investment applications. Tariffs were 
reduced. RAMSI’s assistance was essential in the introduction and the 
protracted passage of difficult reforms in taxation, aviation and 
telecommunications. 
It needs to be acknowledged that many of these achievements come off 
a very low base. It is also true that the impact of these economic 
improvements has largely been confined to the capital, Honiara, while 
the majority of Solomon Islanders live in rural areas remote from the 
capital. The latest United Nations Human Development Index placed 
Solomon Islands at 143rd position out of 186 countries.37 Solomon 
Islands is still classified by the United Nations as a ‘Least Developed 
Country’.   
LESSONS LEARNED 
The key lesson learned from the Economic Governance pillar relates to 
the placement of treasury and finance officials from Australia and New 
Zealand in the Solomon Islands bureaucracy. This was seen as critical in 
the early stages of RAMSI. Solomon Islands government officials 
needed a buffer to resist the tendency of Solomon Islands MPs to 
interfere in the work of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury and other 
agencies. But this effectively created a parallel bureaucracy and resulted 
in a high level of dependence on foreign staff. This was exacerbated by 
difficulties in retaining skilled local staff caused by high demand from 
other organisations working in Solomon Islands as part of RAMSI. 
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Australian officials were also paid much more than their local 
counterparts, which created some resentment within key government 
agencies. 
The experience of RAMSI suggests the placement of Australian staff in 
frontline rather than advisory positions had a negative impact on the 
bureaucracy of Solomon Islands. Rather than relying on Australian 
officials as a buffer, RAMSI should have built local bureaucratic 
leadership in a country where politicians are all too accustomed to using 
the public purse for personal advantage. While Australian officials 
working within the Solomon Islands Government were under pressure to 
demonstrate progress in the Economic Governance pillar, this progress 
has likely come at the cost of helping Solomon Islands Finance and 
Treasury officials develop the skills they need to sustain their 
independence post RAMSI. 
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
The Machinery of Government pillar of RAMSI’s strategy sought to 
improve public accountability, the functioning of parliament, provincial 
governments, the public service and the electoral system, as well as 
increasing women’s participation in parliament and the public sector. 
Through the placement of advisers, and the provision of technical and 
financial assistance, and training and community outreach programs, 
RAMSI had a number of successes. Although many of these programs 
were similar to those of a traditional bilateral aid program, RAMSI’s 
mandate and longevity gave it important advantages in encouraging 
reform. 
Governance in Solomon Islands in 2003 was particularly weak. Many 
government agencies were dysfunctional. As in other developing 
countries, the resources and effectiveness of key public institutions had 
been eroded through a lack of political and financial support.38 
Widespread corruption also undermined governance. The instability 
wrought by the ethnic conflict and the breakdown of the rule of law 
accelerated the collapse of an already ineffective system. 
Comprising just under 4 per cent of overall RAMSI costs (or $103 
million), the Machinery of Government pillar was relatively inexpensive.39  
RAMSI’s assistance to the accountability institutions of Solomon Islands 
showed progress in output and capacity from 2003 levels. By 2010, 80 
per cent of backlogged cases were resolved by the Ombudsman. By 
2012 the Office of the Auditor General had completed all of its audit 
reports.40 More effective controls have been put in place to document the 
private and commercial interests of public officials. The Parliamentary 
Strengthening Program succeeded in developing a committee system to 
 AUSTRALIA’S COSTLY INVESTMENT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS: THE LESSONS OF RAMSI 
 
15
 
scrutinise legislation, expenditure, foreign relations and parliamentary 
processes.  
The level of professionalism and human resources management in the 
public service in Solomon Islands was improved. A new human 
resources management and payroll system was implemented in 2011, 
leading to significant savings by resolving payroll discrepancies and 
fraud.41 RAMSI re-established and supported the Institute of Public 
Administration and Management, which has since trained 1,374 
Solomon Islands’ government participants in policy development, 
financial management and ethics in 2012. Thirty-six per cent of trainees 
were women.42 
Although women’s participation in parliament and the public sector 
appears limited, Solomon Islands has improved its female participation 
relative to the situation in other Pacific Island countries. There is one 
woman in Parliament. Women make up 20 per cent of the workforce in 
the public sector, although 60 per cent of these are in junior positions. 
Five of 25 permanent secretary positions are held by women.43 
Despite all these successes, significant governance challenges remain. 
Former member of parliament Joses Tuhanuku says, “of all the areas 
RAMSI has attempted to strengthen, it is governance that has 
undoubtedly proved the most challenging and real progress, the most 
elusive.”44 He argues that despite the improvements in the accountability 
institutions, little or no action has been taken in response to reports from 
the Auditor General or Ombudsman.45 For example, in 2010, not one of 
the audit reports produced by the Auditor General was tabled in 
Parliament.46 Achieving better accountability is also hindered by limited 
capacity in Solomon Islands’ civil society and media sector to demand 
better results.  
RAMSI had no mandate to address political reform in Solomon Islands. 
Despite their desperate calls for external assistance to help the country 
address the problems created by the ethnic conflict, it is highly unlikely 
Solomon Islands leaders would have agreed to a significant program of 
political reform. Cautious about local political sensitivities about its role, 
RAMSI was reluctant to become involved in efforts by the Solomon 
Islands Government to engage in constitutional reform, or to introduce 
legislation that would encourage greater political stability. 
Yet political leaders, and indeed all MPs, have the potential to exercise a 
great deal of influence in making the machinery of government work and 
in promoting the rule of law. Lack of support from the legislature may 
threaten the enduring positive impacts of the work of RAMSI, across all 
three pillars of the mission. 
The prominent Solomon Islands regional official Transform Aqorau says 
that all the good work done by RAMSI in restoring law and order has 
been undermined by politicians. He argues that rather than 
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demonstrating respect for the rule of law, members of parliament have 
“instead undermined the rule of law and given themselves power over 
the way millions of dollars are spent in ways that are disproportionate to 
the needs of Solomon Islanders.”47   
The PPF had the power to arrest politicians for crimes, including 
corruption. A number of former politicians, including Allan Kemakeza, the 
prime minister who negotiated the establishment of RAMSI, were 
arrested and later jailed for crimes they committed prior to 2003. But 
even this threat of punishment has failed to deter members of parliament 
from corrupt practices or from interfering in the proper processes of 
government. Politicians continue to be elected on the amount of direct 
benefits they are able to deliver to their constituents rather than on the 
quality of their work as ministers and parliamentarians.  
LESSONS LEARNED  
RAMSI’s limited successes in improving public sector processes, 
capacity and accountability, have relied largely on encouraging good 
governance practices and the effective practice of the rule of law 
amongst officials. But ultimately serious change was never going to 
occur without political leaders taking responsibility for changing the 
system. Unfortunately the political system of Solomon Islands 
encourages the political class to undermine the rule of law and spend 
ever-increasing sums of money on enriching themselves and their 
supporters. RAMSI had neither the mandate nor the leverage to reform 
the politics of Solomon Islands. Without such reform many of the 
accountability gains brokered by RAMSI will likely be lost. Although it 
may well be impossible for any external actors to influence change in the 
politics of Solomon Islands, it is important for Australia to recognise the 
limitations of reforms that are not driven by politicians themselves or that 
are perceived as inimical to the political and business culture of Solomon 
Islands. 
In thinking about future Australian initiatives to improve the machinery of 
government in Pacific Island countries, a key lesson from RAMSI is that 
improving legal, oversight and investigative processes are not in 
themselves sufficient to tackle corruption. If Australia is serious about 
this issue it needs to find ways to encourage change in the political 
culture of these states. This is no easy task. The need to maintain good 
relations with its Pacific Island counterparts will constrain Australian 
governments from interfering in the politics of Pacific Island states. But 
creative and long-term efforts need to be made. Supporting politicians 
who are interested in reform is important because they often lack 
resources but this must be done in a way that does not compromise 
them or their ability to influence their peers. Providing or enabling expert 
legislative and practical advice on issues such as constitutional and 
electoral reform in Solomon Islands when requested by local institutions 
RAMSI had neither the 
mandate nor the 
leverage to reform the 
politics of Solomon 
Islands. Without such 
reform many of the 
accountability gains 
brokered by RAMSI will 
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can also be valuable in environments where this kind of expertise is 
weak.   
CONCLUSION  
Even if Australia does not make another large-scale intervention in the 
Pacific Islands region, the need of Papua New Guinea and Pacific Island 
countries for external assistance for a variety of governance, economic 
and security challenges is unlikely to disappear. Many of the lessons of 
RAMSI are relevant in these cases. Future decisions to intervene in 
Australia’s neighbourhood should be based on clear assessments of the 
need, the real risk to regional security and Australia’s national interests. 
More work needs to be done to promote inter-departmental and inter-
agency cooperation in Canberra. A response to a security crisis in the 
region should involve the cooperation of regional defence and police 
forces. Assistance provided in such missions in the economic and 
governance spheres is likely to be more effective in the long term if 
delivered through an alliance of aid partners. Such an alliance can 
deploy the most appropriate experts to work with local officials rather 
than set up parallel bureaucracies staffed by foreign officials. It is also 
important not to shy away from promoting real change at the political and 
not just the bureaucratic level.  
However, if there is one lesson that needs to be drawn from RAMSI it is 
the importance of knowing how much to spend and when to leave. 
Missions of this type need an exit strategy based on limited and defined 
criteria that should be agreed at the outset. Rigorous and honest 
assessments of performance and impact need to be made, as do 
judgements about when the costs of continuing a mission outweigh any 
possible benefits. In the case of RAMSI a massive and disproportionate 
investment accumulated over time largely because no one was prepared 
to make the difficult decision to end the mission. It would be easy to 
blame this on risk-averse officials. Ultimately, however, prime ministers 
and ministers need to assume this responsibility. In the case of RAMSI, 
$2.6 billion was a massive investment for a country where Australia’s 
interests are limited. A willingness by political leaders to seriously 
question what was being gained by persisting with the intervention might 
have helped prevent what was initially a good investment in regional 
stability and development from becoming a much more questionable 
one. 
Future decisions to 
intervene in Australia’s 
neighbourhood should  
be based on clear 
assessments of the 
need, the real risk to 
regional security and 
Australia’s national 
interests. 
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